Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14



Doing

In a spirit of cheerful irony, let me introduce the experimental part

of this book by quoting the most theory-oriented philosopher of recent times, namely Karl Popper:

I suppose that the most central usage Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 of the term `real' is its use to characterize material things of ordinary size - things which a baby can handle and (preferably) put into his mouth. From this, the usage of the Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 term `real' is extended, first, to bigger things - things which are too big for us to handle, like railway trains, houses, mountains, the earth and the stars, and also to smaller things Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 - things like dust particles or mites. It is further extended, of course, to liquids and then also to air, to gases and to molecules and atoms.

146 Break

What is the principle behind Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 the extension? It is, I suggest, that the entities which we conjecture to be real should be able to exert a causal effect upon the prima fade real things; that is, upon Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 material things of an ordinary size: that we can explain changes in the ordinary material world of things by the causal effects of entities conjectured to be real.2

That is Karl Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 Popper's characterization of our usage of the word `real'. Note the traditional Lockeian fantasy beginnings. `Real' is a concept we get from what we, as infants, could put in our mouths Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14. That is a charming picture, not free from nuance. Its absurdity equals that of my own preposterous story of reals and represen­tations. Yet Popper points in the right direction. Reality has to do with Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 causation and our notions of reality are formed from our abilities to change the world.

Maybe there are two quite distinct mythical origins of the idea of `reality'. One is the Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 reality of representation, the other, the idea of what affects us and what we can affect. Scientific realism is commonly discussed under the heading of representation. Let us now discuss it Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 under the heading of intervention. My conclusion is obvious, even trifling. We shall count as real what we can use to intervene in the world to affect something else, or what the world can Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 use to affect us. Reality as intervention does not even begin to mesh with reality as representation until modern science. Natural science since the seventeenth century has been the adventure Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 of the interlocking of representing and intervening. It is time that philosophy caught up to three centuries of our own past.


^ 2 Karl Popper and John Eccles, The Self and its Brain Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14, Berlin, New York and London, 1977, P. 9.

Kuhn, Thomas S. "Postscript - 1969", i

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 3rd ed. University of Chicago Press 1996 ss. 174-210

ISBN: 0-226-45807-5

Copyright (C) 1996 University of Chicago Press

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Postscript Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 1969

It has now been almost seven years since this book was first published.' In the interim both the response of critics and my own further work have increased my understanding of a Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 number of the issues it raises. On fundamentals my viewpoint is very nearly unchanged, but I now recognize aspects of its initial formulation that create gratuitous difficulties and misunder­standings. Since Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 some of those misunderstandings have been my own, their elimination enables me to gain ground that should ultimately provide the basis for a new version of the book.' Meanwhile, I welcome Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 the chance to sketch needed revisions, to comment on some reiterated criticisms, and to suggest directions in which my own thought is presently developing.'

Several of the key difficulties of my original text cluster Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 about the concept of a paradigm, and my discussion begins with them.' In the subsection that follows at once, I suggest the desirability of disentangling that concept from the notion of a Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 scientific com­munity, indicate how this may be done, and discuss some signifi 


i This postscript was first prepared at the suggestion of my onetime student and longtime friend, Dr Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14. Shigeru Nakayama of the University of Tokyo, for inclusion in his Japanese translation of this book. I am grateful to him for the idea, for his patience in awaiting its fruition, and for permission to Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 include the result in the English language edition.

2 For this edition I have attempted no systematic rewriting, restricting altera­tions to a few typographical errors plus two passages which contained Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 isolable errors. One of these is the description of the role of Newton's Principia in the development of eighteenth-century mechanics on pp. 30-33, above. The other concerns the response to Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 crises on p. 84.

3 Other indications will be found in two recent essays of mine: "Reflection on My Critics," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge, 1970); and Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 "Second Thoughts on Para­digms," in Frederick Suppe (ed.), The Structure of Scientific Theories (Urbana, Ill., 1970 or 1971), both currently in press. I shall cite the first of these essays below as "Reflections" and the Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 volume in which it appears as Growth of Knowl­edge; the second essay will be referred to as "Second Thoughts."

4 For particularly cogent criticism of my initial presentation of paradigms see Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14: Margaret Masterman, "The Nature of a Paradigm," in Growth of Knowledge; and Dudley Shapere, "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions," Philosophical Review, ^ LXXIII (1984), 383-94.

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cant consequences of the resulting analytic separation. Next I Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 consider what occurs when paradigms are sought by examining the behavior of the members of a previously determined scien­tific community. That procedure quickly discloses that in much of the book the Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 term `paradigm' is used in two different senses. On the one хэнд, it stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14. On the other, it denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 the remaining puzzles of normal science. The first sense of the term, call it the sociological, is the subject of Sub-section 2, below; Subsection 3 is devoted to paradigms as Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 exem­plary past achievements.

Philosophically, at least, this second sense of `paradigm' is the deeper of the two, and the claims I have мейд in its name are the main sources for the Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 controversies and misunderstand­ings that the book has evoked, particularly for the charge that I make of science a subjective and irrational enterprise. These issues are considered in Subsections 4 and 5. The Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 first argues that terms like `subjective' and `intuitive' cannot appropriately be applied to the components of knowledge that I have described as tacitly embedded in shared examples. Though such knowl­edge is not, without Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 essential change, subject to paraphrase in terms of rules and criteria, it is nevertheless systematic, time tested, and in some sense corrigible. Subsection 5 applies that argument to the problem of choice between Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 two incompatible theories, urging in brief conclusion that men who hold incom­mensurable viewpoints be thought of as members of different language communities and that their communication problems be analyzed as problems of Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 translation. Three residual issues are discussed in the concluding Subsections, 6 and 7. The first con-siders the charge that the view of science developed in this book is through-and-through relativistic. The Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 second begins by inquir­ing whether my argument really suffers, as has been said, from a confusion between the descriptive and the normative modes; it concludes with brief remarks on Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 a topic deserving a separate

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essay: the extent to which the book's main theses may legiti­mately be applied to fields other than science.

^ 1. Paradigms and Community Structure

The term `paradigm' enters the Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 preceding pages early, and its manner of entry is intrinsically circular. A paradigm is what the members of a scientific community share, and, conversely, a scientific community consists of men who Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 share a paradigm. Not all circularities are vicious (I shall defend an argument of similar structure late in this postscript), but this one is a source of real difficulties. Scientific communities can and Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 should be isolated without prior recourse to paradigms; the latter can then be discovered by scrutinizing the behavior of a given commu­nity's members. If this book were being rewritten, it Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 would therefore open with a discussion of the community structure of science, a topic that has recently become a significant subject of sociological research and that historians of science are also Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 be-ginning to take seriously. Preliminary results, many of them still unpublished, suggest that the empirical techniques required for its exploration are non-trivial, but some are in хэнд and others are sure to Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 be developed.` Most practicing scientists respond at once to questions about their community affiliations, taking for granted that responsibility for the various current specialties is distributed among groups of at least roughly Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 determinate mem­bership. I shall therefore here assume that more systematic means for their identification will be found. Instead of presenting preliminary research results, let me briefly articulate the intui­tive notion of Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 community that underlies much in the earlier chapters of this book. It is a notion now widely shared by scien­tists, sociologists, and a number of historians of science.


5 W. O. Hagstrom Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14, ^ The Scientific Community (New York, 1965), chaps. iv and v; D. J. Price and D. de B. Beaver, "Collaboration in an Invisible College," American Psychologist, XXI (1966), 1011-18; Diana Crane, "Social Structure Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 in a Group of Scientists: A Test of the `Invisible College' Hypothesis," American Sociological Review, ^ XXXIV (1969), 335-52; N. C. Mullins, Social Networks among Biological Scientists, (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1966), and "The Micro-Structure Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 of an Invisible College: The Phage Group" (paper delivered at an annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Boston, 1968).

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A scientific community consists, on this view, of the practi­tioners of Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 a scientific specialty. To an extent unparalleled in most other fields, they have undergone similar educations and profes­sional initiations; in the process they have absorbed the same technical literature and drawn Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 many of the same lessons from it. Usually the boundaries of that standard literature mark the limits of a scientific subject matter, and each community ordi­narily has a subject matter of its own Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14. There are schools in the sciences, communities, that is, which approach the same subject from incompatible viewpoints. But they are far rarer there than in other fields; they are always in competition Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14; and their compe­tition is usually quickly ended. As a result, the members of a scientific community see themselves and are seen by others as the men uniquely responsible for the Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 pursuit of a set of shared goals, including the training of their successors. Within such groups communication is relatively full and professional judg­ment relatively unanimous. Because the attention of different scientific communities is Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14, on the other хэнд, focused on different matters, professional communication across group lines is some-times arduous, often results in misunderstanding, and may, if pursued, evoke significant and previously unsuspected Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 disagreement.

Communities in this sense exist, of course, at numerous levels. The most global is the community of all natural scientists. At an only slightly lower level the main scientific professional groups Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 are communities: physicists, chemists, astronomers, zoologists, and the like. For these major groupings, community membership is readily established except at the fringes. Subject of highest degree, membership in professional societies, and journals Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 read are ordinarily more than sufficient. Similar tech­niques will also isolate major subgroups: organic chemists, and perhaps protein chemists among them, solid-state and high-energy physicists, radio astronomers, and Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 so on. It is only at the next lower level that empirical problems emerge. How, to take a contemporary example, would one have isolated the phage group prior to its public acclaim? For this purpose Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 one must have recourse to attendance at special conferences, to the distri 

177

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button of draft manuscripts or galley proofs prior to publication, and above all to formal and informal communication networks including Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 those discovered in correspondence and in the link-ages among citations.' I take it that the job can and will be done, at least for the contemporary scene and the more recent Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 parts of the historical. Typically it may yield communities of. perhaps one hundred members, occasionally significantly fewer. Usually individual scientists, particularly the ablest, will belong to several such groups either Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 simultaneously or in succession.

Communities of this sort are the units that this book has presented as the producers and validators of scientific knowl­edge. Paradigms are something shared by the members of Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 such groups. Without reference to the nature of these shared ele­ments, many aspects of science described in the preceding pages can scarcely be understood. But other aspects can, though they are not Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 independently presented in my original text. It is there-fore worth noting, before turning to paradigms directly, a series of issues that require reference to community structure alone.

Probably Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 the most striking of these is what I have previously called the transition from the pre- to the post-paradigm period in the development of a scientific field. That transition is the one Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 sketched above in Section II. Before it occurs, a number of schools compete for the domination of a given field. Afterward, in the wake of some notable scientific achievement, the number of Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 schools is greatly reduced, ordinarily to one, and a more efficient mode of scientific practice begins. The latter is generally esoteric and oriented to puzzle-solving,, as the work of a group Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 can be only when its members take the foundations of their field for granted.

The nature of that transition to maturity deserves fuller dis­cussion than it has received in this Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 book, particularly from those concerned with the development of the contemporary social


0 Eugene Garfield, The Use of Citation Data in Writing the History of Science (Philadelphia: Institute of Scientific Information, 1964); M, M. Kessler, "Com­parison Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 of the Results of Bibliographic Coupling and Analytic Subject Indexing," American Documentation, XVI (1965), 223-33; D. J. Price, "Networks of Scientific Papers," Science, CIL (1985), 510-15.

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sciences. To that end it may help to point Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 out that the transition need not (I now think should not) be associated with the first acquisition of a paradigm. The members of all scientific com­munities, including the schools of the "pre-paradigm Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14" period, share the sorts of elements which I have collectively labelled `a paradigm.' What changes with the transition to maturity is not the presence of a paradigm but rather its nature Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14. Only after the change is normal puzzle-solving research possible. Many of the attributes of a developed science which I have above asso­ciated with the acquisition of a paradigm I Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 would therefore now discuss as consequences of the acquisition of the sort of para­digm that identifies challenging puzzles, supplies clues to their solution, and guarantees that the truly clever practitioner will Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 succeed. Only those who have taken courage from observing that their own field (or school) has paradigms are likely to feel that something important is sacrificed by the change.

A second issue, more Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 important at Ieast to historians, concerns this book's implicit one-to-one identification of scientific com­munities with scientific subject matters. I have, that is, repeat­edly acted as though, say Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14, `physical optics,' `electricity,' and `heat' must name scientific communities because they do name subject matters for research. The only alternative my text has seemed to allow is that all these subjects Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 have belonged to the physics community. Identifications of that sort will not, however, usually withstand examination, as my colleagues in history have repeatedly pointed out. There was, for example, no physics Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 community before the mid-nineteenth century, and it was then formed by the merger of parts of two previously separate com­munities, mathematics and natural philosophy (physique exper-i­mentale). What is Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 today the subject matter for a single broad community has been variously distributed among diverse com­munities in the past. Other narrower subjects, for example heat and the theory of matter, have existed for Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 long periods without becoming the special province of any single scientific commu­nity. Both normal science and revolutions are, however, com­munity-based activities. To discover and analyze them, one must Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 first unravel the changing community structure of the sciences

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over time. A paradigm governs, in the first instance, not a subject matter but rather a group of practitioners. Any study of paradigm-directed Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 or of paradigm-shattering research must begin by locating the responsible group or groups.

When the analysis of scientific development is approached in that way, several difficulties which have been foci for critical attention Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 are likely to vanish. A number of commentators have, for example, used the theory of matter to suggest that I dras­tically overstate the unanimity of scientists in their Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 allegiance to a paradigm. Until comparatively recently, they point out, those theories have been topics for continuing disagreement and debate. I agree with the description but think it no counter-example. Theories of matter Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 were not, at least until about 1920, the special province or the subject matter for any scientific community. Instead, they were tools for a large number of specialists' groups. Members of different Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 communities some-times chose different tools and criticized the choice мейд by others. Even more important, a theory of matter is not the sort of topic on which the members of even a Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 single community must necessarily agree. The need for agreement depends on what it is the community does. Chemistry in the first half of the nineteenth century provides a case in Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 point. Though several of the community's fundamental tools-constant proportion, multi­ple proportion, and combining weights-had become common property as a result of Dalton's atomic theory, it was quite possible for Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 chemists, after the event, to base their work on these tools and to disagree, sometimes vehemently, about the existence of atoms.

Some other difficulties and misunderstandings will, I believe, be Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 dissolved in the same way. Partly because of the examples I have chosen and partly because of my vagueness about the nature and size of the relevant communities, a few readers of this Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 book have concluded that my concern is primarily or exclusively with major revolutions such as those associated with Copernicus, Newton, Darwin, or Einstein. A clearer delineation of community structure should, however, help to Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 enforce the rather different impression I have tried to create. A revolution

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is for me a special sort of change involving a certain sort of reconstruction of group commitments. But it need not be Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 a large change, nor need it seem revolutionary to those outside a single community, consisting perhaps of fewer than twenty-five people. It is just because this type of change, little recognized Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 or dis-cussed in the literature of the philosophy of science, occurs so regularly on this smaller scale that revolutionary, as against cumulative, change so badly needs to be understood.

One Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 last alteration, closely related to the preceding, may help to facilitate that understanding. A number of critics have doubted whether crisis, the common awareness that something has gone wrong, precedes revolutions so Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 invariably as I have implied in my original text. Nothing important to my argument depends, however, on crises' being an absolute prerequisite to revolutions; they need only be the usual prelude, supplying Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14, that is, a self-correcting mechanism which ensures that the rigidity of normal science will not forever go unchallenged. Revolutions may also be induced in other ways, though I think they seldom Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 are. In addition, I would now point out what the absence of an adequate discussion of community structure has obscured above: crises need not be generated by the work of the Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 community that experiences them and that sometimes under-goes revolution as a result. New instruments like the electron microscope or new laws like MaxweIl's may develop in one specialty and their assimilation create Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 crisis in another.

^ 2. Paradigms as the Constellation of Group Commitments

Turn now to paradigms and ask what they can possibly be. My original text leaves no more obscure or important question. One Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 sympathetic reader, who shares my conviction that `paradigm' names the central philosophical elements of the book, prepared a partial analytic index and concluded that the term is used in at Ieast twenty-two Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 different ways.' Most of those differences are, I now think, due to stylistic inconsistencies (e.g., Newton's Laws are sometimes a paradigm, sometimes parts of a paradigm, and

7 Masterman, op Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14. cit.

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sometimes paradigmatic), and they can be eliminated with rela­tive ease. But, with that editorial work done, two very different usages of the term would remain, and they require separation. The more global Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 use is the subject of this subsection; the other will be considered in the next.

Having isolated a particular community of specialists by techniques like those just discussed, one Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 may usefully ask: What do its members share that accounts for the relative fulness of their professional communication and the relative unanimity of their professional judgments? To that question my original text licenses the answer Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14, a paradigm or set of paradigms. But for this use, unlike the one to be discussed below, the term is inap­propriate. Scientists themselves would say they share a Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 theory or set of theories, and I shall be glad if the term can ultimately be recaptured for this use. As currently used in philosophy of science, however, `theory' connotes a structure far Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 more limited in nature and scope than the one required here. Until the term can be freed from its current implications, it will avoid confusion to adopt another. For present purposes I Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 suggest `disciplinary matrix': `disciplinary' because it refers to the common possession of the practitioners of a particular discipline; `matrix' because it is composed of ordered elements of various sorts, each requiring further Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 specification. All or most of the objects of group com­mitment that my original text makes paradigms, parts of para­digms, or paradigmatic are constituents of the disciplinary matrix, and as such Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 they form a whole and function together. They are, however, no longer to be discussed as though they were all of a piece. I shall not here attempt an exhaustive list, but noting Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 the main sorts of components of a disciplinary matrix will both clarify the nature of my present approach and simulta­neously prepare for my next main point.

One important sort of component I Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 shall label `symbolic generalizations,' having in mind those expressions, deployed without question or dissent by group members, which can readily be cast in a logical form like (x)(y)(z Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14)Ø(x, y, z). They are the formal or the readily formalizable components of the disciplinary matrix. Sometimes they are found already in sym 

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bolic form: f = ma or I = V/R Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14. Others are ordinarily expressed in words: "elements combine in constant proportion by weight," or "action equals reaction." If it were not for the general accept­ance of expressions like these, there would be no Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 points at which group members could attach the powerful techniques of logical and mathematical manipulation in their puzzle-solving enter-prise. Though the example of taxonomy suggests that normal science can proceed with Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 few such expressions, the power of a science seems quite generally to increase with the number of symbolic generalizations its practioners have at their disposal.

These generalizations look like laws Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 of nature, but their func­tion for group members is not often that alone. Sometimes it is: for example the Joule-Lenz Law, H = Rh. When that law was discovered, community members already knew Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 what H, R, and I stood for, and these generalizations simply told them something about the behavior of heat, current, and resistance that they had not known before. But more often, as Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 discussion earlier in the book indicates, symbolic generalizations simultaneously serve a second function, one that is ordinarily sharply separated in analyses by philosophers of science. Like f = ma or I Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 = V/ R, they function in part as laws but also in part as definitions of some of the symbols they deploy. Furthermore, the balance between their inseparable legislative and definitional force shifts over time Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14. In another context these points would repay detailed analysis, for the nature of the commitment to a law is very different from that of commitment to a definition. Laws are often corrigible Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 piecemeal, but definitions, being tautologies, are not. For example, part of what the acceptance of Ohm's Law demanded was a redefinition of both `current' and 'resist­ance'; if those terms Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 had continued to mean what they had meant before, Ohm's Law could not have been right; that is why it was so strenuously opposed as, say, the Joule-Lenz Law was note Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 Probably that situation is typical. I currently suspect that

8 For significant parts of this episode see: T. M. Brown, "The Electric Current in Early Nineteenth-Century French Physics," Historical Studies in the Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 Physical Sciences, I (1989), 61-103, and Morton Schagrin, "Resistance to Ohm's Law," American Journal of Physics, XXI (1963 ), 536-47.

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all revolutions involve, among other things, the abandonment of generalizations the force of which had Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 previously been in some part that of tautologies. Did Einstein show that simultaneity was relative or did he alter the notion of simultaneity itself? Were those who heard paradox in the phrase `relativity of Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 simultaneity' simply wrong?

Consider next a second type of component of the disciplinary matrix, one about which a good deal has been said in my original text under such rubrics as Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 `metaphysical paradigms' or `the meta-physical parts of paradigms.' I have in mind shared commit­ments to such beliefs as: heat is the kinetic energy of the con­stituent parts of bodies; all Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 perceptible phenomena are due to the interaction of qualitatively neutral atoms in the void, or, alternatively, to matter and force, or to fields. Rewriting the book now I would describe such Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 commitments as beliefs in particular models, and I would expand the category models to include also the relatively heuristic variety: the electric circuit may be re­garded as a steady-state hydrodynamic Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 system; the molecules of a gas behave like tiny elastic billiard balls in random motion. Though the strength of group commitment varies, with non-trivial consequences, along the spectrum from heuristic Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 to onto-logical models, all models have similar functions. Among other things they supply the group with preferred or permissible analogies and metaphors. By doing so they help to determine what will be Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 accepted as an explanation and as a puzzle-solution; conversely, they assist in the determination of the roster of unsolved puzzles and in the evaluation of the importance of each Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14. Note, however, that the members of scientific communities may not have to share even heuristic models, though they usually do so. I have already pointed out that membership in the com­munity of chemists during Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 the first half of the nineteenth cen­tury did not demand a belief in atoms.

A third sort of element in the disciplinary matrix I shall here describe as values. Usually they Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 are more widely shared among different communities than either symbolic generalizations or models, and they do much to provide a sense of community to natural scientists as a whole. Though Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 they function at all times, their particular importance emerges when the members of a

184

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particular community must identify crisis or, later, choose be­tween incompatible ways of practicing their discipline. Prob­ably Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 the most deeply held values concern predictions: they should be accurate; quantitative predictions are preferable to qualitative ones; whatever the margin of permissible error, it should be consistently satisfied in a given field; and Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 so on. There are also, however, values to be used in judging whole theories: they must, first and foremost, permit puzzle-formulation and solution; where possible they should be simple, self-consistent Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14, and plausible, compatible, that is, with other theories currently deployed. (I now think it a weakness of my original text that so little attention is given to such values as Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 internal and external consistency in considering sources of crisis and factors in theory choice.) Other sorts of values exist as well-for example, science should (or need not) be socially useful-but the preceding should Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 indicate what I have in mind.

One aspect of shared values does, however, require particular mention. To a greater extent than other sorts of components of the disciplinary matrix Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14, values may be shared by men who differ in their application. Judgments of accuracy are relatively, though not entirely, stable from one time to another and from one member to another in a particular group Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14. But judgments of simplicity, consistency, plausibility, and so on often vary greatly from individual to individual. What was for Einstein an insup­portable inconsistency in the old quantum theory, one that Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 rendered the pursuit of normal science impossible, was for Bohr and others a difficulty that could be expected to work itself out by normal means. Even more important, in those Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 situations where values must be applied, different values, taken alone, would often dictate different choices. One theory may be more accurate but less consistent or plausible than another; again the old quantum theory provides an Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 example. In short, though values are widely shared by scientists and though commitment to them is both deep and constitutive of science, the application of values is sometimes considerably affected Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 by the features of individual personality and biography that differentiate the members of the group.

To many readers of the preceding chapters, this characteristic

185

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of the operation of shared values has seemed a major Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 weakness of my position. Because I insist that what scientists share is not sufficient to command uniform assent about such matters as the choice between competing theories or the distinction between an ordinary Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 anomaly and a crisis-provoking one, I am occasion-ally accused of glorifying subjectivity and even irrationality.° But that reaction ignores two characteristics displayed by value judgments in any field. First Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14, shared values can be important determinants of group behavior even though the members of the group do not all apply them in the same way. (If that were not the case, there would Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 be no special philosophic problems about value theory or aesthetics.) Men did not all paint alike during the periods when representation was a primary value, but. the developmental pattern Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 of the plastic arts changed drastically when that value was abandoned.10 Imagine what would hap-pen in the sciences if consistency ceased to be a primary value. Second, individual variability in the Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 application of shared values may serve functions essential to science. The points at which values must be applied are invariably also those at which risks must be taken. Most anomalies are resolved by normal Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 means; most proposals for new theories do prove to be wrong. If all members of a community responded to each anomaly as a source of crisis or embraced each new Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 theory advanced by a colleague, science would cease. If, on the other хэнд, no one reacted to anomalies or to brand-new theories in high-risk ways, there would be few or no Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 revolutions. In matters like these the resort to shared values rather than to shared rules governing individual choice may be the community's way of distributing risk and assuring the long-term success of Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 its enterprise.

Turn now to a fourth sort of element in the disciplinary matrix, not the only other kind but the last I shall discuss here. For it the Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 term `paradigm' would be entirely appropriate, both philologi 


9 See particularly: Dudley Shapere, "Meaning and Scientific Change," in Mind and Cosmos: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy, The Uni­versity of Pittsburgh Series in the Philosophy Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 of Science, III (Pittsburgh, 1966), 41-85; Israel Schef3er, Science and Subjectivity (New York, 1967); and the essays of Sir Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos in Growth of Knowledge.

10 See the discussion Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 at the beginning of Section XIII, above.

186

Postscript

cally and autobiographically; this is the component of a group's shared commitments which first led me to the choice of that word. Because the Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 term has assumed a life of its own, however, I shall here substitute `exemplars.' By it I mean, initially, the concrete problem-solutions that students encounter from the start of their scientific education, whether in Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 laboratories, on examinations, or at the ends of chapters in science texts. To these shared examples should, however, be added at least some of the technical problem-solutions found Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 in the periodical literature that scientists encounter during their past-educational research careers and that also show them by example how their job is to be done. More than other sorts of components Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 of the disciplinary matrix, differences between sets of exemplars provide the com­munity fine-structure of science. All physicists, for example, be-gin by learning the same exemplars: problems such as the inclined plane Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14, the conical pendulum, and Keplerian orbits; in­struments such as the vernier, the calorimeter, and the Wheat-stone bridge. As their training develops, however, the symbolic generalizations they share Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 are increasingly illustrated by differ­ent exemplars. Though both solid-state and field-theoretic physi­cists share the Schrodinger equation, only its more elementary applications are common to both groups.

^ 3. Paradigms as Shared Examples

The paradigm Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 as shared example is the central element of what I now take to be the most novel and least understood aspect of this book. Exemplars will therefore require more attention Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 than the other sorts of components of the disciplinary matrix. Philosophers of science have not ordinarily discussed the prob­lems encountered by a student in laboratories or in science texts, for these are Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 thought to supply only practice in the application of what the student already knows. He cannot, it is said, solve problems at all unless he has first learned the theory Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 and some rules for applying it. Scientific knowledge is embedded in theory and rules; problems are supplied to gain facility in their appli­cation. I have tried to argue, however, that this localization of

187

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the cognitive Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 content of science is wrong. After the student has done many problems, he may gain only added facility by solving more. But at the start and for some time after Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14, doing problems is learning consequential things about nature. In the absence of such exemplars, the laws and theories he has previously learned would have little empirical content.

To indicate what I have in mind Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 I revert briefly to symbolic generalizations. One widely shared example is Newton's Second Law of Motion, generally written as f = ma. The sociologist, say, or the linguist who discovers Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 that the corresponding expression is unproblematically uttered and received by the members of a given community will not, without much additional investiga­tion, have learned a great deal about what either Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 the expression or the terms in it mean, about how the scientists of the commu­nity attach the expression to nature. Indeed, the fact that they accept it without question and use Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 it as a point at which to introduce logical and mathematical manipulation does not of itself imply that they agree at all about such matters as meaning and application. Of course they do Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 agree to a considerable extent, or the fact would rapidly emerge from their subsequent conversation. But one may well ask at what point and by what means they have come to do Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 so. How have they learned, faced with a given experimental situation, to pick out the relevant forces, masses, and accelerations?

In practice, though this aspect of the situation is seldom or never noted, what Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 students have to learn is even more complex than that. It is not quite the case that logical and mathematical manipulation are applied directly to f = ma. That expression Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 proves on examination to be a law-sketch or a law-schema. As the student or the practicing scientist moves from one problem situa­tion to the next, the symbolic generalization to Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 which such ma­nipulations apply changes. For the case of free fall, f = ma

becomes mg = m22 ; for the simple pendulum it is transformed


to mg sine = -mld?; for a pair of interacting harmonic oscilla­tors it Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 becomes two equations, the first of which may be written 188

Postscript nit del + /cal = k2 ( s2 - Si + d) ; and for more complex situa 

tions, such as the gyroscope, it takes Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 still other forms, the family resemblance of which to f = ma is still harder to discover. Yet, while learning to identify forces, masses, and accelerations in a variety of physical situations not previously Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 encountered, the student has also learned to design the appropriate version of f = ma through which to interrelate them, often a version for which he has encountered no literal equivalent before. How Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 has he learned to do this?

A phenomenon familiar to both students of science and his­torians of science provides a clue. The former regularly report that they have read through Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 a chapter of their text, understood it perfectly, but nonetheless had difficulty solving a number of the problems at the chapter's end. Ordinarily, also, those diffi­culties dissolve in the same Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 way. The student discovers, with or without the assistance of his instructor, a way to see his problem as like a problem he has already encountered. Having seen the resemblance, grasped the Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 analogy between two or more distinct problems, he can interrelate symbols and attach them to nature in the ways that have proved effective before. The Iaw-sketch, say f = ma, has Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 functioned as a tool, informing the student what similarities to look for, signaling the gestalt in which the situation is to be seen. The resultant ability to see a variety of situations as like Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 each other, as subjects for f = ma or some other symbolic generalization, is, I think, the main thing a student acquires by doing exemplary problems, whether with a pencil and paper or Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 in a well-designed laboratory. After he has completed a certain number, which may vary widely from one individual to the next, he views the situations that confront him as a scientist Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 in the same gestalt as other members of his specialists' group. For him they are no longer the same situations he had encountered when his training began. He has meanwhile Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 assimilated a time-tested and group-licensed way of seeing.

The role of acquired similarity relations also shows clearly in the history of science. Scientists solve puzzles by modeling them on previous puzzle-solutions Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14, often with only minimal recourse

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to symbolic generalizations. Galileo found that a ball rolling down an incline acquires just enough velocity to return it to the same vertical height on a Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 second incline of any slope, and he learned to see that experimental situation as like the pendulum with a point-mass for a bob. Huyghens then solved the problem of the center Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 of oscillation of a physical pendulum by imagining that the extended body of the latter was composed of Galilean point-pendula, the bonds between which could be instanta­neously released at any point in the Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 swing. After the bonds were released, the individual point-pendula would swing freely, but their collective center of gravity when each attained its highest point would, like that of Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 Galileo's pendulum, rise only to the height from which the center of gravity of the extended pendu­lum had begun to fall. Finally, Daniel Bernoulli discovered how to make the flow Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 of water from an orifice resemble Huyghens' pendulum. Determine the descent of the center of gravity of the water in tank and jet during an infinitesimal interval of time. Next imagine that each particle of Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 water afterward moves sepa­rately upward to the maximum height attainable with the velocity acquired during that interval. The ascent of the center of gravity of the individual particles must then equal Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 the descent of the center of gravity of the water in tank and jet. From that view of the problem the long-sought speed of efflux followed at once."

That example should Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 begin to make clear what I mean by learning from problems to see situations as like each other, as subjects for the application of the same scientific law or Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 law-sketch. Simultaneously it should show why I refer to the conse­quential knowledge of nature acquired while learning the simi­larity relationship and thereafter embodied in a way of viewing

11 For the example Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14, see: Rent Dugas, A History of Mechanics, trans. J. R. Maddox (Neuchatel, 1955), pp. 135-36, 186-93, and Daniel Bernoulli, Hydro­dynamica, sive de viribus et motibus fiuidorum, commentarii opus academicura (Strasbourg, 1738), Sec. iii. For the extent Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 to which mechanics progressed during the first half of the eighteenth century by modelling one problem-solution on another, see Clifford Truesdell, "Reactions of Late Baroque Mechanics to Success, Conjecture, Error Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14, and Failure in Newton's Principia," Texas Quarterly, X (1967 ), 238-58.



Postscript

physical situations rather than in rules or laws. The three prob­lems in the example, all of them exemplars for eighteenth-cen Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14­tury mechanicians, deploy only one law of nature. Known as the Principle of vis viva, it was usually stated as: "Actual descent equals potential ascent." Bernoulli's application of the law should Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 suggest how consequential it was. Yet the verbal state-ment of the law, taken by itself, is virtually impotent. Present it to a contemporary student of physics, who knows the words and can Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 do all these problems but now employs different means. Then imagine what the words, though all well known, can have said to a man who did not know even the problems. For him Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 the generalization could begin to function only when he learned to recognize "actual descents" and "potential ascents" as ingredi­ents of nature, and that is to learn something, prior to the law, about Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 the situations that nature does and does not present. That sort of learning is not acquired by exclusively verbal means. Rather it comes as one is given words together Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 with concrete examples of how they function in use; nature and words are learned together. To borrow once more Michael Polanyi's useful phrase, what results from this process is "tacit knowledge Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14" which is learned by doing science rather than by acquiring rules for doing it.

^ 4. Tacit Knowledge and Intuition

That reference to tacit knowledge and the concurrent rejec­tion of rules isolates another problem that has Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 bothered many of my critics and seemed to provide a basis for charges of subjec­tivity and irrationality. Some readers have felt that I was trying to make science rest Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 on unanalyzable individual intuitions rather than on logic and law. But that interpretation goes astray in two essential respects. First, if I am talking at all about intuitions, they are not individual. Rather they Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 are the tested and shared possessions of the members of a successful group, and the novice acquires them through training as a part of his preparation for group-membership. Second, they are Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 not in principle unanalyz­able. On the contrary, I am currently experimenting with a

191

Postscript

computer program designed to investigate their properties at an elementary level.

About that program I shall have nothing to say Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 here,12 but even mention of it should make my most essential point. When I speak of knowledge embedded in shared exemplars, I am not referring to a mode of knowing Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 that is less systematic or less analyzable than knowledge embedded in rules, Iaws, or criteria of identification. Instead I have in mind a manner of knowing which is miscontrued if reconstructed Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 in terms of rules that are first abstracted from exemplars and thereafter function in their stead. Or, to put the same point differently, when I speak of acquiring from exemplars the ability to Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 recognize a given situa­tion as like some and unlike others that one has seen before, I am not suggesting a process that is not potentially fully explic­able in terms Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 of neuro-cerebral mechanism. Instead I am claim-ing that the explication will not, by its nature, answer the question, "Similar with respect to what?" That question is a request for a Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 rule, in this ease for the criteria by which particular situations are grouped into similarity sets, and I am arguing that the temptation to seek criteria (or at least a full set) should be resisted Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 in this case. It is not, however, system but a particular sort of system that I am opposing.

To give that point substance, I must briefly digress. What follows seems obvious Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 to me now, but the constant recourse in my original text to phrases like "the world changes" suggests that it has not always been so. If two people stand at Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 the same place and gaze in the same direction, we must, under pain of solipsism, conclude that they receive closely similar stimuli. (If both could put their eyes at the same place Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14, the stimuli would be identical.) But people do not see stimuli; our knowl­edge of them is highly theoretical and abstract. Instead they have sensations, and we are under no compulsion to suppose that Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 the sensations of our two viewers are the same. (Sceptics might remember that color blindness was nowhere noticed until John Dalton's description of it in I794.) On the contrary Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14, much


12 Some information on this subject can be found in "Second Thoughts."

192

Postscript

neural processing takes place between the receipt of a stimulus and the awareness of a sensation. Among the few things that we know Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 about it with assurance are: that very different stimuli can produce the same sensations; that the same stimulus can produce very different sensations; and, finally, that the route from stimu­lus to Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 sensation is in part conditioned by education. Individuals raised in different societies behave on some occasions as though they saw different things. If we were not tempted to identify stimuli one-to-one Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 with sensations, we might recognize that they actually do so.

Notice now that two groups, the members of which have syste­matically different sensations on receipt of the same stimuli Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14, do in some sense live in different worlds. We posit the existence of stimuli to explain our perceptions of the world, and we posit their immutability to avoid both individual and social Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 solipsism. About neither posit have I the slightest reservation. But our world is populated in the first instance not by stimuli but by the objects of our sensations, and these need Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 not be the same, indi­vidual to individual or group to group. To the extent, of course, that individuals belong to the same group and thus share educa­tion, language, experience, and culture, we have Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 good reason to suppose that their sensations are the same. How else are we to understand the fulness of their communication and the com­munality of their behavioral responses to their environment Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14? They must see things, process stimuli, in much the same ways. But where the differentiation and specialization of groups be-gins, we have no similar evidence for the immutability Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 of sensa­tion. Mere parochialism, I suspect, makes us suppose that the route from stimuli to sensation is the same for the members of all groups.

Returning now to exemplars and rules, what I Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 have been try-ing to suggest, in however preliminary a fashion, is this. One of the fundamental techniques by which the members of a group, whether an entire culture or a specialists' sub Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14-community within it, learn to see the same things when confronted with the same stimuli is by being shown examples of situations that their predecessors in the group have already Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 learned to see as like

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each other and as different from other sorts of situations. These similar situations may be successive sensory presentations of the same individual-say of mother, who is ultimately Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 recognized on sight as what she is and as different from father or sister. They may be presentations of the members of natural families, say of swans on the one хэнд and of Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 geese on the other. Or they may, for the members of more specialized groups, be examples of the Newtonian situation, of situations, that is, that are alike in being subject to Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 a version of the symbolic form f = ma and that are different from those situations to which, for example, the, law-sketches of optics apply.

Grant for the moment that something of this sort Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 does occur. Ought we say that what has been acquired from exemplars is rules and the ability to apply them? That description is tempting because our seeing a situation as like ones Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 we have encountered before must be the result of neural processing, fully governed by physical and chemical laws. In this sense, once we have learned to do it, recognition of similarity must Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 be as fully systematic as the beating of our hearts. But that very parallel suggests that recognition may also be involuntary, a process over which we have no control. If Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 it is, then we may not properly conceive it as something we manage by applying rules and criteria. To speak of it in those terms implies that we have access to alternatives, that Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 we might, for example, have disobeyed a rule, or misapplied a criterion, or experimented with some other way of seeing.13 Those, I take it, are just the sorts of things we cannot do Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14.

Or, more precisely, those are things we cannot do until after we have had a sensation, perceived something. Then we do often seek criteria and put them to use. Then we may Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 engage in inter­pretation, a deliberative process by which we choose among alternatives as we do not in perception itself. Perhaps, for exam­ple, something is odd about what Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 we have seen (remember the anomalous playing cards). Turning a corner we see mother


13 This point might never have needed making if all laws were Iike Newton's and all rules like the Ten Commandments. In Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 that case the phrase 'breaking a law' would be nonsense, and a rejection of rules would not seem to imply a process not governed by law. Unfortunately, traffic laws Det utdannings­vitenskapelige fakultet - 14 and similar products of legislation can be broken, which makes the confusion easy.
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